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We consider repeated games with private monitoring that are ￿close￿ to
repeated games with public/perfect monitoring. A private monitoring infor-
mation structure is close to a public monitoring information structure when
private signals can generate approximately the same distribution of the public
signal once they are aggregated into a public signal by some public coordination
device. A player￿ s informational size associated with the public coordination
device is the key to inducing truth-telling in nearby private monitoring games
when communication is possible. A player is informationally small given a pub-
lic coordination device if she believes that her signal is likely to have a small
impact on the public signal generated by the public coordinating device. We
show that a uniformly strict equilibrium with public monitoring is robust in a
certain sense: it remains an equilibrium in nearby private monitoring repeated
games when the associated public coordination device, which makes private
monitoring close to public monitoring, keeps every player informationally small
at the same time.
We also prove a new folk theorem for repeated games with private monitor-
ing and communication by exploiting the connection between public monitoring
games and private monitoring games via public coordination devices.
Keywords: Communication, Folk theorem, Informational size, Perfect mon-
itoring, Private monitoring, Public monitoring, Repeated games, Robustness
JEL Classi￿cations: C72, C73, D82
1 Introduction
Cooperation within groups is an important and commonly observed social phenom-
enon, but the way in which cooperation arises is one of the least understood questions
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We thank George Mailath for very helpful discussions and the audience in numerous conferences
and seminars for helpful comments. Postlewaite gratefully acknowledges support from National
Science Foundation grant SBR-9810693.
1in economics. The theory of repeated games has improved our understanding by
showing how coordinated threats to punish can prevent deviations from coopera-
tive behavior, but much of the work in repeated games rests on very restrictive
assumption that all players share the same public information either perfectly or
imperfectly. For the case in which each player can observe all other players￿actions
directly (perfect monitoring), Aumann and Shapley [5] and Rubinstein [26] proved
a folk theorem without discounting, and Fudenberg and Maskin [12] proved a folk
theorem with discounting. For the case in which each player observes a noisy public
signal (imperfect public monitoring), Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti [1] characterized
the set of pure strategy sequential equilibrium payo⁄s and Fudenberg, Levine and
Maskin [13] proved a folk theorem.
But a theory that rests on the assumption that there is common knowledge of a
su¢ cient statistic about all past behavior is, at best, incomplete. Such a theory is of
little help in understanding behavior in groups in which there are idiosyncratic errors
in individuals￿observations of outcomes.1 For many problems, it is more realistic
to consider players who possess only partial information about the environment
and, most importantly, players may not know the information possessed by other
players. In such problems, players may communicate their partial information to
other players in order to build a ￿consensus￿regarding the current situation, which
can be used to coordinate their future behavior. In this view, repeated games with
public information can be thought of as a reduced form of a more complex interaction
involving information sharing.
This point of view leads us to examine the robustness of equilibria with public
monitoring when monitoring is private, but ￿close￿to public monitoring. For exam-
ple, one can think of a situation in which information contained in the public signal
is dispersed among the players in the form of noisy private signals. If the amount of
information contained in each player￿ s private signal is negligible, then it is tempting
to consider the game with such private signals and the underlying game with public
signals as being ￿close.￿ In this paper, we examine whether an equilibrium with
public monitoring remains an equilibrium with respect to a public signal generated
from private monitoring and communication, and whether (and how) players can be
induced to reveal their private information.
To make these ideas precise, consider a public monitoring game (G;￿) and a pri-
vate monitoring game (G0;p); where G and G0 are normal form games with public
monitoring and private monitoring respectively. In (G;￿), each action pro￿le a gen-
erates a public signal y from a set Y with probability ￿(yja): In (G0;p), each action
pro￿le a generates a private signal pro￿le s = (s1;::;sn) with probability p(sja): In
our analysis of the private monitoring game (G0;p), we will augment the model with
a ￿public coordination device￿￿ that chooses a public coordinating signal (possibly
randomly) from Y based on the reported pro￿le of private signals. In this expanded
1For example, team production in which each individual observes the outcome with error lies
outside this framework.
2game, players choose an action pro￿le a, observe their private signals (s1;::;sn), and
publicly announce the (not necessarily honest) pro￿le (s0
1;::;s0
n). A public coordi-
nating signal y 2 Y is then selected with probability ￿(yjs0
1;::;s0
n): If the players
report their private signals truthfully, then the probability that the realized public
coordinating signal is y given a and ￿ is equal to p￿(yja) =
P
s2S ￿(yjs)p(sja): We
say that (G;￿) and (G0;p) are close when G and G0 are close in terms of payo⁄s and
there exists a public coordinating device ￿ such that ￿(yja) ￿ p￿(yja): We call the
private monitoring repeated game augmented by such public coordinating devices
(which may change over time) a communication extension of the repeated game as-
sociated with (G0;p): We then ask the following question: for a given perfect public
equilibrium ￿￿ of the repeated game with imperfect public monitoring associated
with (G;￿) and given the repeated game associated with any nearby private mon-
itoring game (G0;p), can we ￿nd a communication extension and an equilibrium
in which players (i) truthfully reveal their signals along the equilibrium path and
(ii) choose their actions as a function of the history of public coordinating signals
according to ￿￿?
If revelation constraints can be ignored and players are assumed to announce
their private signals truthfully, then it is straightforward to show that ￿￿ is an
equilibrium with respect the public signal generated by ￿ as the game reduces to
a repeated game of public monitoring
￿
G0;p￿￿
. Since G0 is close to G and p￿ is
close to ￿; it is easy to show that ￿￿ remains an equilibrium of the repeated game
of public monitoring game
￿
G0;p￿￿
if it is a uniformly strict equilibrium of the
original repeated game of (G;￿). Hence our analysis is mainly concerned with
revelation constraints. The revelation of private information can be problematic,
as can be seen in a simple trigger strategy equilibrium to support collusion. For a
trigger strategy equilibrium to work, it is essential that every player reports ￿bad￿
outcomes honestly. However it is clear that players will not want to reveal any
private information that may trigger mutual punishment.
We ￿nd that the following two concepts are the key to deal with the revelation
constraints: informational size and distributional variability. Roughly speaking,
player i is informationally small if for each action pro￿le a, her private information
is unlikely to have a large e⁄ect on the distribution of the public coordinating signal
p￿(￿ja). Consequently, small informational size will imply that she will have little
incentive to misreport her private signal in order to manipulate the other players￿
behavior to her advantage. Players are naturally informationally small in numerous
settings. Suppose, for example, that there are many players whose signals are noisy
observations of an underlying (but unobserved) common signal, and that these noisy
observations are conditionally i.i.d.. If ￿ maps each signal pro￿le into the posterior
distribution of the unobserved signal, then each player is informationally small by
the law of large numbers. Alternatively, with the same function ￿, agents receiving
conditionally i.i.d. signals of the unobserved signal would be informationally small
if their signals are very precise, even if the number of players is small (but at least
3three). Distributional variability is an index that measures a correlation between a
player￿ s private signal and the public coordinating signal which she would expect
when she reports her signal truthfully. If this index is large, that means that a
player￿ s conditional belief about the public coordinating signal varies widely with
respect to her private information. The larger this index is, the easier it is to
detect and punish a lie. With these concepts, our result can be stated as follows:
a uniformly strict equilibrium is robust when, for some public coordination device,
(1) (G0;p) is close to (G;￿) in the sense described above and (2) each player￿ s
informational size is small relative to her distributional variability.
The way to induce honest reporting is roughly as follows. If ￿ is employed in
every period, then p￿(yja) is always close to ￿(yja); but players may have an incentive
to send false reports. To address this, we employ di⁄erent public coordinating




, where each ￿ht is a perturbation
of ￿: When every player￿ s informational size is small relative to her distributional




so that every revelation constraint is
satis￿ed on the equilibrium path (i.e. after they played the equilibrium action
in the same period), while keeping each perturbation small so that the incentive
constraints regarding the equilibrium actions of ￿￿ are not disturbed.
The second main result of this paper is a new folk theorem for repeated games
with private monitoring and communication. For the robustness result, we start
with a public monitoring game, then consider nearby private monitoring games to
check the robustness of equilibria for repeated games with public monitoring. For
the folk theorem, we take the opposite path: we start with a private monitoring
game, then generate public monitoring games via public coordinating devices. For
repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, there is a well known technique
to prove a folk theorem by Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [13]. We exploit a con-
nection between private monitoring games and public monitoring games via public
coordination devices to import their technique into the domain of private monitor-
ing games and extend it to incorporate revelation constraints. Again it is important
for our result that every player is informationally small.
There are also a couple of technical contributions in this paper. First, we can
prove a uniformly strict folk theorem. That is, we prove a folk theorem by using
uniformly strict equilibria where every player would lose at least a certain amount
of payo⁄s by deviating from the equilibrium action at any history. As a special
case, this result implies a uniformly strict folk theorem for some class of repeated
games with imperfect public monitoring. Another technical contribution of the
paper, which might be of independent interest, is to prove the theorem corresponding
to Theorem 4.1 in [13] without relying on their smoothness condition, which is
commonly used to prove a folk theorem in the literature.
The model is described in Section 2 and the concepts of informational size and
distributional variability are introduced in Section 3. Section 4 states and proves our
robustness result. In Section 5, we prove a new folk theorem for repeated games with
4private monitoring and communication. Section 6 discusses the related literature.
Some proofs are provided in the appendix (Section 7).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Repeated Games with Public Monitoring
The set of players is N = f1;:::;ng. Player i chooses an action from a ￿nite set
Ai. An action pro￿le is denoted by a = (a1;:::;an) 2 ￿iAi := A: Actions are
not publicly observable, but the players observe a public signal from a ￿nite set Y:
The probability that y 2 Y is realized given a 2 A is denoted ￿ (yja): We do not
assume full support. That is, the set fy 2 Y j￿ (yja) > 0g can depend on a 2 A: This
allows for perfect monitoring (Y = A and ￿ (yja) = 1 if y = a) as a special case.
Player i0s stage game payo⁄ is ui (ai;y) and player i￿ s expected stage game payo⁄
is gi (a) =
P
y ui (ai;y)￿ (yja). Consequently, players do not obtain any additional
information regarding the actions of other players from realized payo⁄s. This stage
game is denoted by (G;￿); where G = (N;A;g). We normalize payo⁄s so that each
player￿ s pure strategy minmax payo⁄ is 0. Note that the mixed minmax payo⁄ may
be smaller than the pure strategy minmax payo⁄. The set of feasible payo⁄ pro￿les
is V = cofg (a)ja 2 Ag and V ￿ = fv 2 V jv ￿ 0g is the set of feasible, strictly
individually rational payo⁄ pro￿les.










i while a public history is denoted ht =
￿
y0;:::;yt￿1￿
2 Ht = Y t with H0
i =







a mapping from Ht
i ￿ Ht to Ai: The set of pure strategies for player i is denoted
￿i: We restrict ourselves to pure strategies throughout this paper, so we will simply
use the term strategy to refer to pure strategies when no confusion can arise. A
strategy pro￿le is denoted ￿ = f￿igi2N 2 ￿ := ￿i￿i. A pure strategy pro￿le
induces a probability measure on A1. Player i0s discounted expected payo⁄ given
￿ and ￿ 2 (0;1) is w
￿;￿









.2 We denote this repeated
game associated with (G;￿) by G1
￿ (￿):
A strategy is public if it only depends on Ht. A pro￿le of public strategies is
a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) if, after every public history, the continuation
(public) strategy pro￿le constitutes a Nash equilibrium (Fudenberg, Levine, and
Maskin [13]). Note that a perfect public equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium
when the stage game is one of perfect monitoring. Since we focus on perfect public






















2When x is a generic outcome of some random variable, we often use e x to denote this random
variable.
3Thus we ignore private strategies (Kandori and Obara [17]).
5player i￿ s continuation payo⁄from period t+1: We de￿ne ￿￿uniformly strict perfect
public equilibrium (￿￿USPPE) as follows.
De￿nition 1 A pure strategy perfect public equilibrium ￿ 2 ￿ for G1
















































; and i 2 N:
This means that, at any public history, any player would lose at least ￿ by
any unilateral one-shot deviation. This is stronger than requiring all incentive con-
straints to hold strictly. However, a strict PPE is ￿￿uniformly strict for some ￿ > 0
if it can be represented by a ￿nite state automaton.
2.2 Repeated Game with Private Monitoring and Its Public Com-
munication Extension
Fix a stage game (G;￿) with public monitoring. Consider a private monitoring game
with the same set of players and the same action sets as G: Player i observes a private
signal si from a ￿nite set Si instead of the public signal. A private signal pro￿le
is denoted s = (s1;::;sn) 2 ￿iSi := S: Player i0s stage game payo⁄ is vi (ai;si)
and player i￿ s expected stage game payo⁄ is g0
i (a) =
P
s vi (ai;si)p(sja) where
the conditional distribution on S given a is denoted p(￿ja): We assume that the
marginal distributions have full support, that is, p(sija) :=
P
s￿i p(si;s￿ija) > 0 for
all si 2 Si, a 2 A and i 2 N. Let p(s￿ija;si) :=
p(si;s￿ija)
p(sija) denote the conditional
probability of s￿i 2 S￿i given (a;si): We denote this private monitoring stage
game by (G0;p); where G0 = (N;A;g0): Let V (G0) and V ￿ (G0) be the feasible
payo⁄set and the set of individually rational and feasible payo⁄s for G0: Discounted
average payo⁄s are de￿ned as in the public monitoring case. Let G01
p (￿) be the
corresponding repeated game with private monitoring given ￿ 2 (0;1):
Players communicate directly each period. At the end of each period, players
publicly announce a pro￿le s 2 S. Then, a public coordinating device ￿ : S ! 4(Y )
generates public signal y 2 Y with probability ￿(yjs): A convex combination of two
public coordination devices ￿ and ￿0 is denoted by (1 ￿ ￿)￿+￿￿0; which is de￿ned
by ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿￿0￿
(yjs) := (1 ￿ ￿)￿(yjs) + ￿￿0 (yjs):






6We denote expectations with respect to p￿(￿ja) by E￿[￿ja]: Player i may not report
her signal truthfully. Player i￿ s reporting rule is a function ￿ : Si ! Si: Let Ri be
the set of all reporting rules for player i and ￿i 2 Ri be the truth-telling rule de￿ned
by ￿i (si) = si for all si 2 Si: When player i uses a reporting rule ￿i 2 Ri, we will





as the distribution of the generated public signal given action pro￿le a when i uses
the reporting rule ￿i and the other players report their private signals truthfully.
We denote expectation with respect to p￿ (￿ja;￿i) by E￿[￿ja;￿i]: Assuming honest
reporting by players j 6= i; player i￿ s conditional belief regarding the realization of
the public coordinating signal given (a;si) and report s0










We often use p￿ (yja;si) for p￿ (yja;si;si) to economize on notation.
This formulation of communication is very special. A more general communica-
tion structure would allow for a mediator who receives and sends con￿dential private
information from and to the players4. There are two reasons for not introducing
a mediator in this paper. First, a mediator plays no role in our robustness result
(Section 4). We ask when a perfect public equilibrium for G1
￿ (￿) remains a perfect
public equilibrium when players are engaged in a ￿close￿private monitoring game
(G0;p) augmented with communication. As part of our notion of ￿closeness,￿we
require that private signals in (G0;p) can be aggregated so as to generate a pub-
lic coordinating signal whose distribution is close to ￿. Since public strategies can
only depend on this public coordinating signal by de￿nition, there is no role for
con￿dential announcements or con￿dential recommendations. Second, the lack of a
mediator only strengthens our folk theorem result (Section 5).
In the repeated game (G0;p) augmented with communication as described above,
a public history in period t consists of a sequence of realized public coordinating
signals ht 2 Y t and a sequence of public announcements ht
R 2 St. We allow di⁄erent
coordinating devices to be employed at di⁄erent ht 2 Y t. Given a private monitoring
game (G0;p), a public communication device for (G0;p) is a collection ￿ = f￿ht :
ht 2 Y t;t ￿ 0;g where each ￿ht : S ! ￿(Y ) is a public coordination device. Given
a private monitoring game (G0;p); a discount factor ￿; and a public communication
device ￿; let G01
p (￿;￿) denote the public communication extension of the repeated
game with private monitoring G01
p (￿):
In G01
p (￿;￿); play proceeds in the following way. At the beginning of period










4See Forges [10] and Myerson [22] for mediated communication in dynamic games.
7sequence of her own private actions and private signals. If the resulting action
pro￿le is a, then players receive private signals according to the distribution p(￿ja):
Let s denote the realized signal pro￿le. Then player i makes a public announcement
s0
i contingent on (ht
i;ht;ht
R;ai;si): Of course, s0
i may di⁄er from si: Let s0 2 S denote
the pro￿le of announcements. Then a public coordinating signal is chosen according
to the probability measure ￿ht(￿js0): If s0 is announced and y is realized in period
t; then ht+1




To describe a strategy in G01
p (￿;￿), let Ht = Y t denote the set of histories of
realized public coordinating signals in period t, Ht
R = St denote the set of public
reporting histories, and Ht
i = At
i￿St
i denote the set of private histories for player i in












i;:::);￿ = f￿igi2N ;￿ = f￿igi2N and let ￿ = (￿;￿).
As in the repeated game without communication, pure strategies induce probability
measures on A1. Player i￿s discounted expected payo⁄ in G01













. We usually drop ￿ when it is clear from the context
which public communication device is used.
A strategy ￿i = (￿i;￿i) for player i is truthful if player i reports her private



















and si. Note that we















. A strategy ￿i = (￿i;￿i)
is public if ￿t
i only depends on ht =
￿
y0;:::;yt￿1￿
2 Ht and ￿t




. Since we focus on this class of strategies in the public communication ex-































. Notice that there is a natural one-to-one relationship
between public strategies in G1
￿ (￿) and the action strategy components of public
strategies in G01








p (￿;￿) when every player uses a public strategy, as we can
ignore incentive constraints across di⁄erent ht
i with public strategies for G1
￿ (￿):
We extend the standard de￿nition of perfect public equilibrium to the public
communication extension as follows: a strategy pro￿le ￿ for the public communi-
cation extension is a perfect public equilibrium with communication (which we will
refer to as PPE from now on) if ￿ is a pro￿le of truthful public strategies and the con-
tinuation (public) strategy pro￿le constitutes a Nash equilibrium at the beginning
of every period. A strategy pro￿le ￿ is ￿￿uniformly strict perfect public equilibrium
with comminication if ￿ is a perfect public equilibrium and any player would lose
at least ￿ in term of discounted average payo⁄ at any moment when she deviates
from the equilibrium action.
83 Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
3.1 Distance between Stage Games
We focus on public monitoring games and private monitoring games that are close
to each other. When we say ￿close￿ , it means that a public monitoring game (G;￿)
and a private monitoring game (G0;p) are close in two respects. First, g and g0 are
close. Second, there exists a public coordination device ￿ that can generate a public
signal distribution close to ￿:
De￿nition 2 Let (G0;p) be a private monitoring game and (G;￿) be a public moni-
toring game. Given any public coordinating device ￿, we say that p￿ is an "￿approximation
of ￿ if maxa
￿ ￿￿ (￿ja) ￿ p￿ (￿ja)
￿
￿ ￿ ":5 (G0;p;￿) is an "￿approximation of (G;￿) if
p￿ is an "￿approximation of ￿ and maxi;a jgi (a) ￿ g0
i (a)j ￿ ".
The following is a canonical example of "￿approximation.
Example 1 Conditionally Independent Signals
Let e y denote a random variable that can take the values e y = 0 or e y = 1 with
equal probability. There are n players (n odd). They do not observe the realization
of ~ y but each observes a noisy private signal correlated with e y. Speci￿cally, if ~ y = y,





and di⁄ers from y with probability 1￿￿: These private signals
are conditionally independent. Suppose that all players report their private signals
(s1;::;sn) simultaneously and truthfully and ￿(1js1;::;sn) = 1 if the majority of the
players announce 1 while ￿(0js1;::;sn) = 0 if the majority of the players announce
0:6 Clearly the distribution on f0;1g generated this way is a good approximation of
the original distribution of e y when ￿ is su¢ ciently close to 1 or when the number
of players is su¢ ciently large.
Since our notion of approximation is relatively loose, it may happen that two
seemingly di⁄erent monitoring structures are close to each other. For example, Y
and Si can be be di⁄erent sets. As an another example, consider the following
monitoring structure.
Example 2 Perfectly Complementary Information
Suppose that Y = f0;1g and Si = f0;1g and let ￿ be the distribution of a hidden
signal on Y: There are six players. The distribution p of private signals on S satis￿es
the following. When the true value of the hidden signal is 1; the private signal pro￿le
is such that three players receive signal 0 and three players receive signal 1, and each
5k￿k is Euclidean norm.
6The generated public signal is the maximum likelihood estimate of the true realization of e y in
this example.
9such pro￿le of signals is equally likely. When the true value of the hidden signal
is 0; the private signal pro￿le is either (1;1;1;1;1;1) or (0;0;0;0;0;0); each with
probability 1
2: Consider a public coordination mechanism ￿ such that ￿(0js) = 0 if
at least ￿ve players announce the same signal and ￿(0js) = 1 otherwise. Then p￿ is
a 0￿approximation of ￿:7
In this example, each player is equally likely to observe 0 or 1 for any realization
of the underlying signal. Hence her signal alone provides no information about the
true value of the underlying signal, yet the aggregated private signals completely
reveals the true underlying signal.
In this example (or Example 1 with ￿ = 1 and n ￿ 3); one player￿ s informa-
tion does not a⁄ect the generated public signal at all. Following Postlewaite and
Schmeidler [25], we say that a pair (p;￿) is nonexclusive when p￿ (yja;￿i) = p￿ (yja)
for any a; y, ￿i and i:
3.2 Informational Size, Distributional Variability, and One-Shot
Revelation Game
We turn to the issue of truthful revelation of private information in this subsection.
Although our main interest is in repeated games, it is useful to consider the follow-
ing simple one-shot information revelation game ￿rst. Fix any private monitoring
game (G0;p). For any public coordination device ￿, any pro￿le of payo⁄ functions
w : Y ! Rn, and any a 2 A; the one-shot information revelation game (G0;p;￿;w;a)
is de￿ned as follows. Player i observes a private signal si, which is distributed ac-
cording to p(sja). Players report s0, then a public coordinating signal y is generated
with probability ￿(yjs0). Finally, player i receives payo⁄ wi (y) if the realized value
of the public signal is y. In the context of repeated games, this payo⁄ will be inter-
preted as player i￿ s continuation payo⁄. Consequently, (G0;p;￿;w;a) de￿nes a game
of incomplete information in which a strategy for player i is a function ￿i : Si ! Si


















When do players have incentive to report their private signals truthfully in this
game? To ￿x ideas, consider the extreme case in which (p;￿) is nonexclusive. Then
no player has an incentive to lie because what she reports is irrelevant and does not
a⁄ect the generated public signal at all. Hence truth-telling can be implemented
7We need six players for this example. Suppose that there are only ￿ve players. Either
(1;1;1;1;1) or (0;0;0;0;0) is observed with probability
1
2 given y = 0; and every signal pro￿le
at least two 0 and 1 is observed with equal probability given y = 1: In this case, when (1;1;1;1;0)
is observed, we cannot tell whether one of the ￿rst four players is lying given y = 1 or the last
player is lying given y = 0:
10in a one-shot revelation game for any speci￿cation of the payo⁄ function and any
action when (p;￿) is nonexclusive.
We wish to generalize this simple observation. In general, it should become
￿easier￿to induce truth-telling as each player￿ s in￿ uence on the public coordinating
signal becomes ￿smaller.￿The following index measures the size of this in￿ uence for
each player.
De￿nition 3 (Informational Size)
Player i0s informational size v
￿










￿￿ ￿ > ￿jsi;a) ￿ ￿:
This means that, conditional on (si;a); player i believes that the probability of
her being able to manipulate the public signal distribution by more than v
￿
i (si;a)
is at most v
￿
i (si;a). For example, each player￿ s informational size is 0 in Example
2. We say a player is informationally small when her informational size is small.
Note that there may be a trade-o⁄ between keeping each player￿ s informational
size small and approximating a particular public signal distribution. Suppose that
only player 1 is perfectly informed regarding the realization of ~ y in Example 1, i.e.
￿1 = 1 and ￿i = ￿ 2 (1=2;1) for all i 6= 1: If the goal is to replicate the true
value of y from private signals, then ￿ should assign probability one to the element
of Y = f0;1g that coincides with player 10s private signal. However, this makes
player 1 informationally large. In such a case, it may be preferable to aggregate the
private signals of all players, including player 1, using the majority rule. Although
this majority rule ￿ is informationally inferior to the former ￿, it makes every player
informationally small and p￿ (￿ja) still remains a good approximation of ￿ (￿ja).
Of course, a player￿ s informational size alone is not enough to induce honest
reporting. Since players may still have incentive to misreport their signals, however
small it is, we need to introduce some scheme to punish dishonest reporting. So we
consider the following mechanism design problem: given that a 2 A is played, ￿nd a
public coordination device ￿0 that generates approximately the same distribution as





. For this purpose, we construct a certain scoring
rule that relies on a player￿ s distributional variability.
De￿nition 4 (Distributional Variability of player i given ￿)
￿
￿

















This measures the extent to which player i￿ s conditional (normalized) beliefs
regarding the public coordinating signal are di⁄erent given di⁄erent private signals
11(assuming honest reporting by others). This is close to 1 in Example 1 and equal
to 0 in Example 2. We use this variation of player i￿ s beliefs to induce her to report
her private signals truthfully.8,9
Intuitively, it must be easier to induce players to report their private signals
truthfully when the ￿rst index is smaller and the second index is larger. It turns
out that what is important for truthful revelation is the ratio of these two indexes.
De￿nition 5 The measure p￿ is ￿￿regular for ￿ if v
￿
i (si;a) ￿ ￿￿
￿
i (si;a) for all
si 2 Si; a 2 A; and i 2 N:
For example, p￿ is 0￿regular if (p;￿) is nonexclusive. We can now prove the
following theorem.
Theorem 1 For any private monitoring game (G0;p) and any ￿ 2 (0;1); there
exists a ￿ > 0 such that the following holds: if p￿ is ￿￿regular for some ￿; then for
any a 2 A and any payo⁄ function w : Y ! Rn; there exists a public coordination
device ￿0
a;w : S ! 4(Y ) such that truthful reporting is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
for the one-shot information revelation game
￿




Proof. See Appendix B.
This theorem means that honest reporting can be induced for any one-shot
revelation game by perturbing ￿ slightly. The smaller ￿ is, the smaller the size of
the required perturbation. Note that ￿ depends on ￿ but is independent of the
payo⁄ function and the underlying action. These properties will be important when
this result is applied to repeated games. It is natural that ￿ is independent of a,
since ￿￿regularity requires a certain property across all actions. Observe that the
choice of ￿ is also independent of w. We construct a punishment by perturbing ￿
8Suppose that player i ￿ ips a coin after observing si and let her new private signal be (si;!)
2 Si ￿ fface;downg: This change of information structure should not a⁄ect our result. However
player i￿ s distributional variability is 0 given either (si;face) or (si;down): To deal with this
problem, we could have introduced a more elaborate de￿nition of distributional variability. Let xi



























Then we can keep the distributional variability invariant with respect to such extrinsic private
information by using xi; which maps (si;face) and (si;down) into the same mi:
9Our distributional variability is similar, but di⁄erent from the condition with the same name in
McLean and Postlewaite [21]. Our condition measures the distance between a player￿ s conditional
belief regarding the aggregated public signal, whereas their condition measures the distance between
















(there is no action in [21]).
12slightly so that the distribution of the generated signal remains similar, but truth-
telling is a BNE. Hence, when w is large, the temptation to deviate may be high,
but the size of punishments is large in the same proportion.
This theorem is similar to Theorem 1 in McLean and Postlewaite[21]. However,
notice that there is a di⁄erence between this result and the result in [21]. In [21], each
player￿ s preference is given by ui (x;￿); where ￿ is an unobservable payo⁄ relevant
parameter and x is an allocation, so it is important that the true ￿ is recovered
almost surely (￿negligible uncertainty￿ ) to implement any allocation function x : ￿
7! x(￿). We do not need that the true public signal y is recovered.
When is p￿ likely to be ￿￿regular? Consider a more general version of example
with conditionally independent signals.
De￿nition 6 A private monitoring game (G0;p) is called a ￿￿perturbation of the
public monitoring game (G;￿) if Si = Y for all i; vi (ai;y) = ui (ai;y) for all
(a;y) and i; and there exists qi(￿jy) 2 4(Si) for all y and i such that p(sja) = P
y2Y
Q
i qi(sijy)￿ (yja) and qi(yjy) ￿ ￿ for any y and i.
Suppose that (G0;p) is a ￿￿perturbation of (G;￿): Let ￿M be the ￿majority
rule￿ , which is a public coordination device that chooses y reported by the largest

















and p￿M can generate almost the same signal distribution as ￿ as ￿ ! 1: It follows
that (G0;p) is an "￿approximation of (G;￿) for any given " if ￿ is close enough
to zero. Furthermore, each player￿ s informational size converges to 0 as long as
n ￿ 3 and distributional variability converges to a positive constant as ￿ ! 1: The
following proposition summarizes this observation.
Proposition 1 Fix a public monitoring game (G;￿) with n ￿ 3: For any " > 0 and
￿ > 0; there exists ￿ 2 (0;1) and a public coordination device ￿ such that, for every
￿-perturbation (G0;p) of (G;￿); (G0;p;￿) is an "￿approximation of (G;￿) and p￿
is ￿￿regular:
4 Robustness of PPE
Consider any (G;￿). Suppose that (G0;p) is an "￿approximation of (G;￿): In this
section, we ask the following question: can a PPE ￿￿ of G1
￿ (￿) be a part of a PPE
of G01
p (￿;￿) with the help of some public communication device ￿?
13The answer is again simple in some extreme cases. Let ￿ be a public coordination
device for which p￿ is an "￿approximation of ￿: Suppose that (p;￿) is nonexclusive
and let ￿ be the public communication device where ￿ is used after every public
history, i.e., ￿ht = ￿ for all t and all ht. In this case, we can disregard revelation
constraints completely. Then essentially we just have another repeated game with
public monitoring where the stage game payo⁄s and the public signal distribution
are slightly perturbed. Therefore every ￿￿uniformly strict PPE of (G;￿) is an
￿0￿uniformly strict PPE of G01
p (￿;￿) for some positive ￿0 as long as " is small
enough. This follows from the observation (which is formally demonstrated in the
proof of Theorem 2) that continuation payo⁄s in G01
p (￿;￿) converge to continuation
payo⁄s in G1
￿ (￿) uniformly across all public histories and all public strategies as
" ! 0:
Our robustness result generalizes this observation by relaxing nonexclusivity. It
says that every ￿￿uniformly strict PPE of G1
￿ (￿) is an ￿0￿uniformly strict PPE
of G01
p (￿;￿) for some public communication device ￿ and some positive ￿0 if, for
some public coordinating device ￿, (G0;p;￿) is a very good approximation of (G;￿)
and each player￿ s informational size is relatively small given p￿ (i.e. p￿ is ￿-regular
for enough small ￿).
De￿nition 7 An ￿￿ uniformly strict perfect public equilibrium ￿￿ of G1
￿ (￿) is
strictly robust with respect to (G0;p) if there exists a public communication device
￿￿ and a reporting strategy ￿￿ such that ￿￿ = (￿￿;￿￿) is an ￿0￿uniformly strict
truthful PPE of G01
p (￿;￿￿) for some ￿0 > 0:
Theorem 2 Fix ￿ 2 (0;1) and a public monitoring game (G;￿): For any ￿ > 0;
there exist ￿;" > 0 such that every ￿￿uniformly strict PPE of G1
￿ (￿) is strictly
robust with respect to any (G0;p) for which there exists ￿ such that (G0;p;￿) is an
"-approximation of (G;￿) and p￿ is ￿-regular:
Proof. See Appendix C.
Note that ￿ and " only depend on ￿; but not on a particular equilibrium strat-
egy. To get an idea behind our proof, suppose that private signals are converted
into a public coordinating signal by ￿ in every period, i.e., let ￿ be the public com-
munication device where ￿ht = ￿ for all t and all ht. Furthermore, suppose that
players truthfully reveal their signals so that information revelation constraints are
not present. If ￿￿ is an ￿￿uniformly strict PPE of G1
￿ (￿); then one-shot devia-
tions from ￿￿ are not pro￿table in G01
p (￿;￿) as long as " is small because, as we
mentioned, continuation payo⁄s in G01
p (￿;￿) are close to the continuation payo⁄s
in G1
￿ (￿) uniformly across all public histories and all public strategies: Hence, the
action strategy ￿￿ de￿nes an equilibrium in G01
p (￿;￿) if players report their private
signals truthfully. This step is based only on the idea of "-approximation.
14How can truthful reporting be induced? First focus on the revelation constraint
in the ￿rst period on the equilibrium path (i.e. after the ￿rst period equilibrium
action is played). We use both informational smallness and distributional variability
in this step. Note that this continuation game can be regard as a one-shot revelation
game where the action pro￿le is given by the equilibrium action pro￿le a￿ = ￿￿ ￿
h0￿
and w is given by the continuation payo⁄s from the second period on. Here we can
apply Theorem 1 to perturb ￿ slightly to induce honest reporting: for any ￿ 2 (0;1);
there exists a ￿ > 0 such that, if p￿ is ￿￿regular, then truthful reporting is optimal
for every player in a one-shot revelation game
￿




a￿;w. Of course, we need to make sure to keep perturbation small so that the
strict incentive to play a￿ is preserved. So we choose small enough ￿ (with small
enough ￿ needed for Theorem 1) and " so that p
(1￿￿)￿+￿￿0
a￿;w is a good approximation
of p￿; hence a good approximation of ￿; independent of the speci￿cation of ￿0
a￿;w
if players report their signals truthfully. Then the strict incentive to play a￿ is
preserved in G01
p (￿;￿) given truth-telling.
We also need to consider a joint deviation in action and reporting within the ￿rst
period. This is where informational smallness plays another role. Observe that each
player cannot manipulate ￿ much when " is small. Hence, p
(1￿￿)￿+￿￿0
a￿;w is a good
approximation of ￿ whether a player lies or not as long as she is informationally
small. Therefore it remains unpro￿table to deviate from a￿ in the ￿rst period when
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿￿0
a￿;w is used instead of ￿ when (￿;";￿) are kept small.
Now let us take into account the revelation constraints in all periods. This is
the most delicate step in the proof. To illustrate the problem, focus on some public
history ht: We may proceed as we did before in the ￿rst period: we use the same ￿:
We can choose the same " because of the uniform convergence result stated above.
Then we choose ￿ and construct ￿0
￿￿(ht);w(ht;￿) so that playing ￿￿ ￿
ht￿
and truth-





Furthermore, we can use the same ￿ as before across all public histories because ￿
can be chosen independent of the equilibrium action or continuation payo⁄s thanks
to Theorem 1. However, observe that ￿0
￿￿(ht);w(ht;￿) depends on the continuation
payo⁄s, and the continuation payo⁄s depend on the choice of ￿0
￿￿(hs);w(hs;￿) at every
continuation history hs with s > t: Consequently, we cannot pick a public coordi-
nation device for history ht that is independent of all public coordination devices in
the future.
We apply a ￿xed point theorem to address this problem as follows. First assign
an arbitrary public coordination device to every public history, i.e. we pick some set





. Consider the public communication
device ￿0 =
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿￿0
ht;ht 2 H
￿
, where ￿ is chosen so that the incentive





as long as the players are reporting truthfully and " is chosen small enough. Now
compute the continuation payo⁄s w0 ￿
ht;￿
￿
at every public history ht given this ￿:
Next we choose small ￿ so that Theorem 1 can be applied. Again Theorem 1 is






so that the revelation constraints are satis￿ed









Indeed, we can construct a (compact) set of such public coordination devices at
every public history. This de￿nes a well-behaved correspondence from the space of
sequences of public coordination devices f￿0
ht : ht 2 Ht;t ￿ 0g to itself. Since f￿0
ht :
ht 2 Ht;t ￿ 0g is an in￿nite dimensional space, we can apply Fan-Glicksberg ￿xed
point theorem to obtain a ￿xed point f￿￿
ht : ht 2 Ht;t ￿ 0g: Then all the revelation
constraints are satis￿ed on the equilibrium path with respect to the continuation
payo⁄s that are based on correct public coordination devices f￿￿
ht : ht 2 Ht;t ￿ 0g:
What exactly does this result say about the robustness of PPE in G1
￿ (￿)? To
make the idea precise, let (G;￿) be a game with public monitoring and de￿ne the
"-perturbation class ￿"(G;￿) of (G;￿) as follows:




is an "-approximation of (G;￿)g
As a consequence of Proposition 1, it follows that ￿"(G;￿) 6= ? for all " if n ￿ 3:
We will say that a PPE ￿￿ of G1
￿ (￿) is "￿robust if for every (G0;p;￿) 2 ￿"(G;￿);
there exists a public communication device ￿￿ and a truthful reporting strategy
￿￿ such that ￿￿ = (￿￿;￿￿) is a PPE of G01
p (￿;￿￿): In terms of "-robustness, a
stronger continuity result would be stated as follows: for every ￿ > 0; there exists an
" > 0 such that every ￿-uniformly strict PPE of G1
￿ (￿) is "-robust. The statement
of our Theorem 2 is close to, but not quite the same as, this stronger notion of
robustness. To show that every ￿-uniformly strict PPE of G1
￿ (￿) remains a part
of PPE of G01
p (￿;￿) for some public communication device ￿; we require that
some coordination mechanism ￿ by which (G;￿) is approximated also satis￿es an
additional condition: the informational size must be enough small relative to the
distributional variability given ￿; i.e. p￿ is ￿￿regular.
A simpler robustness result can be obtained with respect to ￿￿perturbations
of public monitoring games. We record the result whose proof is an immediate
consequence of Proposition 1 and Theorem 2.
Corollary 1 Fix a public monitoring game (G;￿) with n ￿ 3 and ￿ 2 (0;1): For
every ￿ > 0; there exists ￿ > 0 and ￿0 2 (0;￿) such that, every ￿￿uniformly strict
perfect public equilibrium of G1
￿ (￿) is strictly robust with respect to any ￿￿perturbation
of (G;￿):
Finally we like to mention another interpretation of our theorem. The existence
of a nontrivial equilibrium in repeated games with private monitoring is a di¢ cult
problem. An ostensibly easier problem is that of the existence of correlated or
communication equilibrium. Our theorem says that, under certain circumstances,
16we can construct a certain type of communication equilibrium for a repeated game
with private monitoring if it is ￿close￿to a game with public monitoring in a certain
sense.
5 Folk Theorem
The previous section focuses on the robustness of PPE in public monitoring games
and touches upon private monitoring games mainly as their approximations. In this
section, our main target is the repeated game with private monitoring itself; we
prove a new folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring and commu-
nication when players are informationally small. We exploit a connection between
public monitoring games and private monitoring games and adapt some standard
techniques for a public-monitoring folk theorem to the domain of private monitoring
games.
Our folk theorem asserts the following. Suppose that for some public coordina-
tion device ￿ for (G0;p) the associated p￿ satis￿es a certain condition that guarantees
a folk theorem in the repeated game with public monitoring game (G0;p￿): Then
there exists a ￿ > 0 such that a folk theorem is also obtained for a communication
extension of the repeated game with private monitoring game G01
p (￿;￿) for some
public communication device ￿ when p￿ is ￿-regular. Furthermore, our folk theorem
is a uniformly strict folk theorem, i.e., a folk theorem with ￿￿uniformly strict PPE
for some ￿ > 0:
To state the theorem more precisely, we need to clarify the ￿certain condition￿
to which we have alluded in the previous paragraph. Given any public signal distri-
bution ￿; let T￿
i (a) ￿ RjY j be de￿ned as
T￿







￿ ￿ (￿ja) : a0
i 6= ai
￿
and let b T￿
i (a) = cofT￿
i (a) [ f0gg:10 The set T￿
i (a) consists of those distributional
changes that player i can induce by choosing a strategy di⁄erent from ai when the
remaining players choose a￿i: The set b T￿
i (a) consists of all feasible distributional
changes that player i can induce. We say that a public signal distribution ￿ satis￿es
distinguishability at a 2 A if for each pair of distinct players i and j, the following
conditions are satis￿ed:
0 = 2 T￿
i (a) [ T￿
j (a) (1)
b T￿
i (a) \ b T￿






j (a) = f0g: (3)
We say that ￿ satis￿es distinguishability if it satis￿es distinguishability at every
a 2 A. (1) means that a unilateral deviation by player i or player j must be
10coX denote the convex hull of X in R
n:
17statistically detectable. (2) and (3) are conditions regarding the distinguishability
of player i￿ s deviation and player j￿ s deviation. It is known that these conditions
are su¢ cient for a folk theorem for repeated games with public monitoring.11
Now we can state our folk theorem. Let E (￿;￿;￿) ￿ Rn be the set of ￿￿uniformly
strict PPE payo⁄ pro￿les of G01
p (￿;￿) given ￿ and ￿.
Theorem 3 Fix any private monitoring game (G0;p). Suppose that intV ￿(G0) 6= ?
and there exists ￿ such that p￿ is distinguishable. Then there exists a ￿ > 0 such
that, if p￿ is ￿￿regular; then the following holds: for each v 2 intV ￿(G0), there
exists an ￿ > 0 and a ￿ 2 (0;1) such that, for each ￿ 2 (￿;1); there exists a public
communication device ￿ and a (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿uniformly strict truthful PPE of G01
p (￿;￿)
with payo⁄ v:
Proof. See Appendix D.
Note that ￿ depends only on the underlying stage game (G0;p) but not on v.
On the other hand, ￿ depends on v; while ￿ depends on both v and ￿:12
Remark.
￿ The assumption intV ￿(G0) 6= ? requires that V ￿(G0) is full dimensional. When
V ￿(G0) is not full-dimensional, we may strengthen the distinguishability con-
dition to prove the same result. To prove this theorem, for each a 2 A and
q 2 Rn such that kqk = 1 and jqij < 1 for all i; we construct x : Y ! Rn that
satis￿es E￿[xija] > E￿[xija0
i;a￿i] for all a0
i 6= ai and all i: If V ￿(G0) is not full
dimensional, the range of x needs to be the a¢ ne space that contains V ￿(G0);
instead of Rn: This additional restriction can be addressed by strengthening
the distinguishability condition. The bottom line is that every proof goes
through if we restrict our attention to the a¢ ne space that contains V ￿(G0):13
See Fudenberg, Levine and Takahashi [14] for the characterization of the limit
equilibrium payo⁄ when V ￿(G0) is not full dimensional.
￿ Is a folk theorem obvious given our robustness result? Take any private moni-
toring game (G0;p) for which there exists ￿ such that p￿ satis￿es distinguisha-
bility. Why not prove a folk theorem with ￿￿uniformly strict PPE for some




11These conditions guarantee that the incentive constraints of player i and j are satis￿ed si-
multaneously by using appropriate transfers (=continuation payo⁄s) even when their transfers are
required to lie on any hyperplane. They are parallel to (A2) and (A3) in Kandori and Matsushima
[16].
12However, ￿ can be chosen independent of v for generic stage games, namely when the solution
for maxa2A gi (a) and mina2A gi (a) is unique for every i:
13In particular, we need to state Lemma 9 with respect a¢ ne spaces and in terms of relative
interior.
18di¢ cult to do) and apply our robustness result? However, this approach is
not satisfactory because we need to tailor the informational size to each target
equilibrium payo⁄ pro￿le and given discount factor to do so, i.e. ￿ depends
on both v and ￿: The strength of the above folk theorem is that we can ￿nd
a ￿xed size of informational smallness for which the folk theorem is obtained,
rather than including ￿ as a parameter that depends on each payo⁄ pro￿le in
the statement of the folk theorem.
5.1 Overview of Proof
We prove our folk theorem in several steps. Some proofs are provided in the appen-
dix.
Self Decomposability with Private Monitoring and Public Coordinat-
ing Device
In the following, a private monitoring game (G0;p) is ￿xed. Rather than analyz-
ing the repeated game directly, we begin by decomposing discounted average payo⁄s
of a repeated game into current payo⁄s and continuation payo⁄s, and then analyze
a collection of one-shot revelation games.
For a public monitoring game (G;￿); an action pro￿le a 2 A is said to be
enforceable with respect to W ￿ Rn and ￿ 2 (0;1) if there exists a function w : Y !
W such that








i 6= ai and i 2 N:
If v = (1 ￿ ￿)g (a)+￿E[w(￿)ja] for some enforceable action a and w : Y ! W; then
we say that v is decomposable with respect to W and ￿: Let B (￿;W) be the set of
payo⁄ pro￿les that are decomposable with respect to W and ￿: It is a known result
that, if any bounded set W0 is self decomposable i.e. W0 ￿ B (￿;W0); then every
payo⁄ in B (￿;W0) (hence in W0) can be supported by a PPE (Abreu, Pearce and
Stacchetti [1]).
We now extend these ideas to the private monitoring game (G0;p) with public
coordination devices. Recall that, given action pro￿le a 2 A; E￿[￿ja] denotes
expectation with respect to p￿(￿ja); E￿[￿ja;￿i] denotes expectation with respect to
p￿ (￿ja;￿i) and ￿i : Si ! Si denotes the honest reporting rule for player i de￿ned by
￿i (si) = si for all si 2 Si.
De￿nition 8 An action pro￿le a 2 A is ￿￿enforceable with respect to W ￿ Rn and
￿ 2 (0;1) if there exists a public coordinating device ￿ : S ! ￿(Y ) and w : Y ! W
such that for all i 2 N;
(i) (1 ￿ ￿)g0





i 6= ai; ￿i : Si ! Si
(ii) (1 ￿ ￿)g0
i (a)+￿E￿[wi (￿)ja] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)g0
i (a)+￿E￿[wi (￿)ja;￿i] for all ￿i 6= ￿i.
19The inequality (i) means that a player would lose more than ￿ when deviating
from a: Inequality (ii) means that dishonest reporting is not pro￿table after a is
played. If a 2 A is ￿￿enforceable with respect to W and ￿ with some vand w and
v = (1 ￿ ￿)g0
i (a) + ￿E￿[wi (￿)ja]; then we say that the triple (a;￿;w) ￿￿enforces v
with respect to W and ￿. We say that v is ￿￿decomposable with respect to W and
￿ when there exists a triple (a;￿;w) that ￿￿enforces v with respect to W and ￿:
Next de￿ne the set of ￿￿decomposable payo⁄s with respect to W and ￿ as
follows.
B (￿;W;￿) := fv 2 Rnjv is ￿ ￿ decomposable with respect to W and ￿g:
We say that W is ￿￿self decomposable with respect to ￿ 2 (0;1) if W ￿ B (￿;W;￿):
It is easy to see that a ￿uniformly strict￿version of Theorem 1 in Abreu, Pearce,
and Stacchetti [1] holds here when ￿ > 0: if W is ￿￿self decomposable with respect
to ￿; then every v 2 W can be supported by a ￿￿uniformly strict PPE of G01
p (￿;￿)
for some public communication device ￿. Note that each payo⁄ pro￿le may need
to be supported by using a di⁄erent public coordinating device. Hence di⁄erent
public coordinating devices need to be used at di⁄erent public histories. Since the
following lemma is a straightforward implication of the result in Abreu, Pearce and
Stacchetti [1], its proof is omitted.
Lemma 1 If W ￿ Rn is bounded and ￿￿self decomposable with respect to ￿ 2 (0;1),
then for any v 2 W; there exists ￿ such that v 2 E (￿;￿;￿).
Local Decomposability is Enough
Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin [13] showed that local self decomposability is
su¢ cient for self decomposability of any convex, compact set for large ￿. Here
we prove the corresponding lemma in our setting. First, we prove a lemma that
establishes a certain monotonicity property of B: The Lemma implies that, if W is
￿￿self decomposable with respect to ￿ 2 (0;1); then W is 1￿￿0
1￿￿ ￿￿self decomposable
for every ￿0 2 (￿;1).





for every ￿0 2 (￿;1):
Proof. Suppose that v 2 C: Since v 2 B (￿;W;￿); v is ￿￿decomposable with
respect to W and ￿; there exists a triple (a;￿;w) that ￿￿enforces v: For any ￿0 > ￿;
de￿ne w￿0









￿0 (1 ￿ ￿)
w(y):
20Clearly, w￿0
(y) 2 W for each y 2 Y since W is convex. Furthermore, we can show




1￿￿ ￿￿enforces v with respect to W













































and conditions (i) and (ii) of De￿nition 8 hold for w￿0
when ￿ is replaced with
1￿￿0




1￿￿ ￿￿enforces v with respect to W and ￿
implying that v is 1￿￿0






for every ￿0 2 (￿;1):
Now we show that local self decomposability implies self decomposability. A set
W ￿ Rn is locally strictly self-decomposable if, for any v 2 W; there exists ￿ > 0;
￿ 2 (0;1) and an open set U containing v such that U \ W ￿ B (￿;W;￿):
Lemma 3 If W ￿ Rn is compact, convex, and locally strictly self decomposable,
then there exists ￿ > 0 and ￿ 2 (0;1) such that W is (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿self decomposable
with respect to ￿ for any ￿ 2 (￿;1):
Proof. Choose v 2 W: Since W is locally strictly self decomposable, there exists
￿v 2 (0;1); ￿v > 0, and an open ball Uv around v such that
Uv \ W ￿ B (￿v;W;￿v):
Since W is compact, there exists a ￿nite subcollection fUvkg
K
k=1 that covers W:










Lemma 2 and the convexity of W imply that







￿ B (￿;W;(1 ￿ ￿)￿)
21for any ￿ 2 (￿;1) and for k = 1;:::;K: Consequently,
W= [K
k=1 (Uvk \ W) ￿ B (￿;W;(1 ￿ ￿)￿):
Proving Local Decomposability
Given Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, the proof of Theorem 3 will be complete if, for
every individually rational and feasible payo⁄ pro￿le v 2 intV ￿(G0); we can ￿nd a
compact, convex, locally self decomposable set that contains it. We call a set in
Rn smooth if it is closed and convex with an interior point in Rn and there exists
the unique tangent hyperplane at every boundary point.14 Since any such v can be
contained in some smooth set in intV ￿(G0), we are done if we can show that every
smooth set in intV ￿(G0) is locally self decomposable. Hence the following lemma
completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Lemma 4 Fix a private monitoring game (G0;p): Suppose that there exists ￿ such
that p￿ is distinguishable. Then there exists a ￿ > 0 such that, if p￿ is ￿￿regular,
then every smooth set W ￿ intV ￿ (G) is locally strictly self decomposable.
Proof. See appendix D.
To prove this, we follow the argument of Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [13] in
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that we can induce players to report their private signals




In this case, we can show that almost every boundary point v on a smooth set
W ￿ intV ￿ (G) is decomposable with respect to the hyperplane that is parallel to
the tangent hyperplane at v if p￿ satis￿es distinguishability. Since we need to induce
truthful reporting at the same time, we need to strengthen this requirement and show
that every such boundary point v is strictly decomposable. We then perturb ￿ and
continuation payo⁄s slightly as in the previous section so that these boundary points
remain strictly decomposable and every player has an incentive to report honestly.
This can be done when every player is informationally small.
A few comments are in order. First, it may be of some technical interest that we
prove this step using some smoothness condition that is weaker than the one in [13],
which is commonly invoked to prove a folk theorem in the literature. Second, we
choose ￿ independent of the target payo⁄ pro￿les as we emphasized. Third, it may
not possible to obtain strict decomposability when the continuation payo⁄s lie on
the tangent hyperplane that is not ￿regular￿(i.e. it is ￿vertical￿or ￿horizontal￿ ; all
the coe¢ cients except one are 0) because the continuation payo⁄s are constant for
14This notion of smoothness is slightly more general than the one in [13] in the sense that the
surface does not need to be twice continuously di⁄erentiable.
22some player. In this case, we obtain strict decomposability by choosing continuation
payo⁄s from a half space bounded away from the target payo⁄ pro￿le. Finally, our
result clearly implies that a uniformly strict folk theorem is obtained for repeated
games with imperfect public monitoring when distinguishability is satis￿ed, because
there is no incentive constraint regarding the revelation of private information in
this case.
6 Related Literature and Discussion
There is a large literature on repeated games with private monitoring and com-
munication. Most papers in the literature focus on a folk theorem rather than
robustness. Our approach is similar to Ben-Porath and Kahneman [6]. They prove
a folk theorem when a player￿ s action is perfectly observed by at least two other
players. For each individually rational and feasible payo⁄pro￿le, they ￿x a strategy
to support it with perfect monitoring, then augment it with a reporting strategy to
support the same payo⁄ pro￿le with direct communication. Their strategies employ
draconian punishments when a player￿ s announcement is inconsistent with others￿
announcements (￿shoot the deviator￿ ). Our paper di⁄ers from their paper in many
respects. Firstly, our paper uses not only perfect monitoring but also imperfect
public monitoring as a benchmark. Secondly, private signals can be noisy in our
paper.
Compte [8] and Kandori and Matsushima [16] consider communication in re-
peated games with private monitoring and provide su¢ cient conditions on the pri-
vate monitoring structure to obtain a folk theorem. Our su¢ cient conditions are
di⁄erent from their conditions. Compte [8] assumes that players￿private signals
are independent conditional on action pro￿les.15 Example 1 does not satisfy this
condition, but we can prove a folk theorem in such environments by combining
Proposition 1 and Theorem 3. Kandori and Matsushima [16] assume that, among
others, a deviation by one player and a deviation by another player can be statis-
tically distinguished based on the private signals of the remaining players. Note
that this condition is similar to, but di⁄erent from our condition (2) and (3). Their
condition and our condition impose the same restriction on the set of probability
measures, but they impose it on the marginal distributions of private signals for
each subset of n ￿ 2 players, whereas we impose it on the public signal distribution
that is approximated by the private signal distribution via some public coordination
device.
Mailath and Morris [18] study robustness of PPE when a public monitoring
structure is perturbed slightly, but without any communication. One of the assump-
tions they need for robustness is that private monitoring is almost public. Private
monitoring is almost public if Si = Y for all i and jPr(s = (y;:::;y)ja) ￿ ￿ (yja)j
15Obara [23] extends Compte [8]￿ s result to the case where private signals are correlated.
23is small for all a and y. In a subsequent work, Mailath and Morris [20] intro-
duced a weaker notion of approximation called "-closeness, which does not as-
sume Si = Y . Their de￿nition of "-closeness (see De￿nition 2 in [20]) implies that
maxa;y jPr(8i; fi (si) = yja) ￿ ￿ (yja)j ￿ " for all a and y given some fi : Si !
Y ￿ f;g;i 2 N; which map private signals to a public signal. While we allow com-
munication to prove the robustness of PPE, our notion of closeness is weaker. In
Example 2, p￿ is a 0￿approximation of ￿ and is 0￿regular, but it is not close to ￿
in their sense. Furthermore, we can show that, when p is "￿close to ￿ in their sense,
there exists a public coordination device ￿ such that p￿ is "(jY j+1)￿approximation
of ￿.16 They show that a certain class of PPE without bounded recall is not robust
to small perturbations of public monitoring. Since there exist uniformly strict PPE
within this class that are robust in our sense with respect to more general pertur-
bations, our result suggests that communication is essential for the robustness of a
certain class of PPE.
Fudenberg and Levine [11] prove a folk theorem for repeated games with private
monitoring and communication when private monitoring is almost perfect messag-
ing. Our folk theorem allows for more general perturbations because almost perfect
messaging is similar to the above weak version of "-closeness in Mailath and Morris
[18]. On the other hand, their result can be applied to two player games, whereas
we need at least three players to guarantee every player is informationally small.
Aoyagi [4] proves a Nash-threat folk theorem in a setting similar to Ben-Porath
and Kahneman [6], but with noisy private monitoring. In his paper, each player is
monitored by a subset of players. Private signals are noisy and re￿ ect the action
16To see this, let
S(y) := fsjfi(si) = y for all ig
and de￿ne






















































= "(jY j + 1):
24of the monitored player very accurately when they are jointly evaluated. That is,
private monitoring is jointly almost perfect. In his paper, players have access to a
more general communication device than ours, namely, mediated communication.
Anderlini and Laguno⁄ [3] consider dynastic repeated games with communica-
tion where short-lived players care about their o⁄springs. As in our paper, players
may have an incentive to conceal bad information so that future generations do not
su⁄er from mutual punishments. Their model is based on perfect monitoring and
their focus is on characterizing the equilibrium payo⁄ set rather than establishing
the robustness of equilibria or proving a folk theorem.
There is an extensive literature dealing with repeated games with private moni-
toring and without communication, starting with Sekiguchi [27]. Many folk theorems
have been obtained in this domain by imposing strong assumptions on the private
monitoring structure. Bhaskar and Obara [7], Ely and V￿lim￿ki [9], Piccioni [24]
prove a folk theorem for a repeated prisoner￿ s dilemma game with private almost-
perfect monitoring. Matsushima [19] proves a folk theorem for a repeated prisoner￿ s
dilemma game with conditionally independent private monitoring. Mailath and
Morris [18] prove a folk theorem for general repeated games with almost-perfect
and almost-public private monitoring. H￿rner and Olszewski [15] prove a folk the-
orem for general repeated games with private almost-perfect monitoring.
257 Appendix
A. Preliminary Lemma
Here we prove several useful lemmas. First we derive a few upper bounds on
player i￿ s ability to manipulate the distribution of a public coordinating signal.
Lemma 5










i (si;a) for all s0
i;si 2 Si; a 2
A and i 2 N:
Proof.
￿




















i (si;a) + v
￿
























i (si;a) for all ￿i; a 2 A and i 2 N:
Proof.
￿ ￿























i (si;a) ￿ 2
￿
1 ￿





for all si; s0


























26B. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Fix a private monitoring game (G0;p) and ￿ 2 (0;1): Pick any payo⁄
function w : Y ! Rn and a 2 A: Without loss of generality, we will assume that
miny2Y wi(y) = 0 for all i 2 N: First we de￿ne a public coordination device ￿0
a;w:
To begin, de￿ne the following function  i : A ￿ S ! [0;1] for each i 2 N






Next, for any pair of probability distributions ￿i;￿
i 2 4(Y ); let
￿0
i;a;￿i;￿
i (yjs) := ￿i (y) i (a;s) + ￿






n as the average of ￿0
i;a;￿i;￿











Next let ￿i;w and ￿
i;w be any pair of probability distributions on Y that satisfy












That is ￿i;w is a distribution on Y that maximizes player i￿ s expected value of wi
and ￿






a;w := (1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿￿0
a;w:
We prove the following claim. Note that this completes the proof of Theorem 1
because ￿ is chosen independent of w and a:
Claim: Suppose that
















If p￿ is ￿￿regular, then truthful reporting is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the






27Proof of Claim: We will prove that, if ￿ satis￿es the condition of the claim













for each i 2 N and each si;s0
i 2 Si: Let wi = maxy2Y wi(y) and note wi ￿ 0 since
miny2Y wi(y) = 0:
We prove this claim in four steps. Fix player i and suppose that player i￿ s true
signal is si; but she dishonestly reports s0
i:















































































































































where the ￿nal inequality follows from Lemmas 5 and 7 and the Cauchy-Schwartz
inequality.







































































where the ￿nal inequality follows from Lemma 5.

































































































































































where the ￿nal inequality follows from Lemma 5.

















































































































































if p￿ is ￿￿regular for any ￿ satisfying
















C. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Let (G;￿) and (G0;p) be a public monitoring game and a private moni-




The discount factor ￿ is ￿xed throughout the proof.
Step 1: Continuation payo⁄s are close with truthful reporting when
stage games are uniformly close.
30Claim: Suppose that ￿ 2 ￿ is a public strategy in G1
￿ (￿); ￿ = f￿ht : ht 2
Y t;t ￿ 0g is a public communication device, ￿ = (￿;￿) is a truthful strategy in





































denotes player i￿ s continuation payo⁄s after ht in G1






























denotes player i￿ s continuation payo⁄s after ht in G01 (￿;￿) given ￿.
Proof: Suppose that ￿ 2 ￿ is a public strategy in G1
￿ (￿); ￿ is a public
communication device and ￿ = (￿;￿) is a truthful strategy in G01 (￿;￿): Choose
any " > 0 and suppose that (G0;p;￿ht) is an "￿approximation of (G;￿) for each





















































































































5 (1 ￿ ￿)" + ￿
p
jY j￿" + ￿B:
Computing the supremum of the left hand side, we obtain B ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)"+￿
p
jY j￿"+










31and the proof of the claim is complete.
Step 2: Constructing the public communication device
Claim: Choose any ￿ 2 (0;1): If ￿ satis￿es (4) and if ￿ is a public coordinating
device for which p￿ is ￿￿regular, then for any pure strategy PPE ￿￿ of G1
￿ (￿);
there exists a collection of public coordinating devices f￿ht : ht 2 Y t;t ￿ 0g, a public
communication device ￿￿ = f(1￿￿)￿+￿￿ht : ht 2 Y t;t ￿ 0g and a truthful strategy





p (￿;￿￿) such that, for each public history
ht; truthful reporting is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the one-shot information
revelation game ￿
G0;p;(1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿￿ht;w(ht;￿);￿￿(ht)
￿
where fw(ht) : ht 2 Y t;t ￿ 0g is the collection of continuation payo⁄s in G01
p (￿;￿￿)
generated by the truthful strategy pro￿le ￿￿:
Proof: As in the proof of Theorem 1, let






and for any pair of probability distributions ￿i;￿
i 2 4(Y ); let
￿0
i;a;￿i;￿
i (yjs) := ￿i (y) i (a;s) + ￿







Let K = (4(Y ) ￿ 4(Y ))
n and let M denote the product of countably many
copies of K indexed by the elements of H := [t￿0Y t: Suppose that ￿￿ is a PPE in
G1












































) 2 R2njY j;
de￿ne a public communication device as follows:
￿(￿;￿) = f(1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿￿￿￿(ht);￿(ht);￿(ht) : ht 2 Y t;t ￿ 0g:
For each i, choose a reporting strategy ￿￿
i so that ￿￿
i = (￿￿
i;￿￿
i) is truthful. Then
the strategy pro￿le ￿￿ and the public communication device ￿(￿;￿) de￿ne contin-
uation payo⁄s in the game G01






denote player i￿ s continuation payo⁄ in G01
p (￿;￿(￿;￿)) at public
32history ht: Next, de￿ne for each ￿ 2 M a subset ￿(￿) ￿ M as follows: ￿0 2 ￿(￿) if
and only if
￿0























for all ht 2 Y t and i 2 N: We will now show that the correspondence ￿ : M ! M
has a ￿xed point by applying the Fan-Glicksberg ￿xed point theorem.
First, let X denote the Cartesian product of countably many copies of R2njY j
indexed by H := [t￿0Y t. Since R2njY j is a locally convex topological vector space,
it follows that X is a locally convex topological vector space with respect to the
product topology. (Theorem 5.1 and Lemma 5.54 in Aliprantis and Border [2]).
Since K ￿ R2njY j is nonempty, convex and compact, we conclude that M is a
nonempty, convex, compact subset of X in the product topology.
Clearly ￿ is nonempty, convex valued, and compact valued. So we need only ver-
ify that ￿ is upper hemicontinuous. Upper hemicontinuity will follow from Berge￿ s





is a continuous real valued
function on M for each t and ht 2 Y t since the product of upper hemicontinuous
correspondences from M to K is upper hemicontinuous with respect to the product
topology on X (to prove the last assertion, modify the argument of Theorem 16.28





is continuous, ￿rst de￿ne
￿
￿
ht = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿￿￿￿(ht);￿(ht);￿(ht)


















































































































Next, note that the product topology on X is metrizable (recall that X is a
countable product) with well known metric ^ d as de￿ned, for example, in Theorem
3.24 of [2]. For this metric ^ d; the following condition holds: for each ￿ > 0 and each
t, there exists a ￿ > 0 (depending on ￿ and t) such that for each s ￿ t and each
hs 2 Y s;
^ d(￿;￿0) < ￿ ) d1(￿(hs);￿0 (hs)) < ￿:
That is, we can make ￿(hs) and ￿0 (hs) as close with respect to d1 as we wish for all
i 2 N and for any hs with 0 ￿ s ￿ t by making ￿ and ￿0 close enough with respect














is a continuous real valued function on M for each ht 2 H: Therefore, we conclude
that ￿ : M ! M is nonempty valued, convex valued, compact valued and up-
per hemicontinuous. Applying the Fan-Glicksberg ￿xed point theorem, there exists






























for every ht 2 H and i 2 N; we can apply the claim in the proof of Theorem 1: if















and if p￿ is ￿￿regular, then truthful reporting is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in
the one-shot information revelation game
￿





for every ht 2 H:
De￿ning ￿ht := ￿￿￿(ht);￿￿(ht);￿￿(ht) and
￿￿ := f(1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿￿￿￿(ht);￿￿(ht);￿￿(ht) : ht 2 Y t;t ￿ 0g
completes the proof of the claim.
34Step 3: Checking all one-period deviations.
Fix any ￿ > 0: In this step, we ￿nd " > 0 and ￿ > 0 that have the property
stated in the theorem: if (G0;p;￿) is "￿approximation of (G;￿) and p￿ is ￿￿regular
for ￿; then for any ￿￿uniformly strict PPE ￿￿ of G1
￿ (￿); there exists a public
communication device ￿ and a truthful reporting strategy ￿￿ such that ￿￿ = (￿￿;￿￿)
is a PPE of G01
p (￿;￿).


























Suppose that (G0;p;￿) is an "￿approximation of (G;￿) and p￿ is ￿￿regular for
￿: Furthermore, suppose that ￿￿ is an ￿￿uniformly strict PPE of G1
￿ (￿): Using (4)
and applying step 2, there exists a collection f￿ht : ht 2 Y t;t ￿ 0g and a public
communication device ￿￿ = f￿￿
ht : ht 2 Y t;t ￿ 0g; where ￿￿
ht = (1￿￿)￿+￿￿ht; such
that truthful reporting is optimal in G01
p (￿;￿￿) given ￿￿: Next, de￿ne a reporting






si if ai = ￿￿
i(ht)
any optimal report if ai 6= ￿￿
i(ht)
:
We will show that ￿￿ = (￿￿;￿￿) is a truthful PPE of the public communica-
tion extension G01
p (￿;￿￿): It is clearly truthful by de￿nition. To verify sequential
rationality constraints, we apply the principle of optimality and check one-period
deviations at every public history ht 2 H at the beginning of each period. We must
check two types of deviations: those which involve a deviation at the action stage
and those that do not. By construction of ￿￿, honest reporting is optimal when the
equilibrium action is played within the same period, i.e. when ￿￿(ht) is played given
public history ht: Consequently, the second type of deviation is not pro￿table. To
complete the argument, we must show that, for any ht 2 H and any i 2 N; player

























Since ￿￿ is ￿￿uniformly strict, at every ht and for every i 2 N; the following




































17We do not derive the optimal reporting strategy o⁄ the equilibrium path explicitly, as it is not
needed for our proof.
35We compare the left hand side and the right hand of this inequality with the corre-


































































for any ht; ai 6= ￿￿
i(ht); and ￿i : Si ! Si:
To begin, note that (4) implies that 2" <
￿
3: Since (G0;p;￿) is "￿approximation















































































To see this, note that player i￿ s expected loss at ht in G01



































































































































































































































































































































































Y ￿￿ (by ￿-regularity and Lemma 7).
Therefore player i￿ s expected loss at ht in G01





































































































for every ￿i; every ht and every i 2 N. Let ￿0 =
￿
3: Then we can conclude that the
suggested strategy ￿￿ = (￿￿;￿￿) is a ￿0￿uniformly strict truthful PPE of G01
p (￿;￿￿).
This completes the proof of the theorem.
37D. Proof of Theorem 3
Let Q = fq 2 Rnjkqk = 1g and ei = (0;0;::;1;:::;0)> 2 Q with the ith coordi-
nate equal to 1. First we prove two lemmata to prove Lemma 4.
Lemma 8 Suppose that p￿ is distinguishable for some public coordinating device ￿:
Then there exists ￿ > 0 such that, if p￿ is ￿￿regular, then for any q 2 Q and a 2 A,






= 0 for j = 1;:::;n (9)










j 6= aj and for all j 2 N (10)
E￿0
[￿jja] ￿ E￿[￿jja;￿j] for all ￿j and for all j 2 N (11)
q ￿ w(y) = 0 for all y 2 Y (12)










j 6= aj and for all j 2 N (13)
E￿0
[￿jja] ￿ E￿[￿jja;￿j] for all ￿j and for all j 2 N (14)





a : Y ! R satisfying the following conditions
E￿[zxi;j;z
a ja] > E￿[zxi;j;z
a ja0
i;a￿i] for all a0
i 6= ai for z = +;￿
E￿[xi;j;z
a ja] > E￿[xi;j;z
a ja0
j;a￿j] for all a0
j 6= aj for z = +;￿
and
jjxi;j;+






a exist as a consequence of (1)-(3) and an application
of the separating hyperplane theorem.
Step 2: We ￿rst consider the case of (ii). Take any q 2 Q such that jqjj < 1 for
any j. This q is ￿xed throughout step 1-4. Let i be a player such that jqij ￿ jqjj for
all j. If qi < 0, then de￿ne x(a;q) : Y ! Rn as follows: for each y 2 Y;
x
(a;q)
j (y) : = xi;j;+
a (y) if qj ￿ 0 and j 6= i
x
(a;q)
j (y) : = xi;j;￿
a (y) if qj < 0 and j 6= i
x
(a;q)








38If qi > 0, then de￿ne x(a;q) : Y ! Rn as follows: for each y 2 Y;
x
(a;q)
j (y) : = xi;j;￿
a (y) if qj ￿ 0 and j 6= i
x
(a;q)
j (y) : = xi;j;+
a (y) if qj < 0 and j 6= i
x
(a;q)








From these de￿nitions, it follows that q￿x(a;q) (y) = 0 for all y 2 Y so that condition
(12) is satis￿ed:
Step 3: For each s 2 S and a 2 A; let






as in the proof of Theorem 1. De￿ne ￿0









j;a;x(a;q)(s) =  j (a;s) ￿ ￿j +
￿





j) is a probability measure on Y that assigns probability zero to any y
not a member of argmaxy02Y x
(a;q)
j (y0) (argminy02Y x
(a;q)
j (y0)). Finally, let
￿￿
a;x(a;q) := (1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿￿0
a;x(a;q)
for some ￿ 2 (0;1):
Let
￿1 = minfE￿[zxi;j;z
a ja] ￿ E￿[zxi;j;z
a ja0
i;a￿i] : for all i;j;a;a0
i 6= ai and z = +;￿g;
￿2 = minfE￿[xi;j;z
a ja] ￿ E￿[xi;j;z
a ja0
j;a￿j] for all i;j;a; a0
j 6= aj and z = +;￿g
and de￿ne
￿ := minf￿1;￿2g:
Note that ￿ > 0 and it is de￿ned independent of a or q:
Step 4: In this step, we prove that condition (10) hold for x(a;q) : Y ! Rn if p￿







￿ ￿ 4￿ > 0 (￿)

















39To accomplish this, suppose that qi < 0 and let x = x(a;q) for notational ease. The
case with qi > 0 is similar, thus omitted. First consider j 6= i for which qj ￿ 0 so
that xj := x
i;j;+
a : For any a0





= (1 ￿ ￿)
h
E￿[xi;j;+














a ja] ￿ E￿[xi;j;+
a ja0
j;a￿j;￿j] ￿ 4￿ (because
￿ ￿xi;j;+
a
￿ ￿ = 1)
= E￿[xi;j;+




























i (si;a) ￿ 4￿
























j 6= aj and ￿j:
Finally for player i; the same proof implies that
E￿￿
a;x[zxi;j;z
a ja] ￿ E￿￿
a;x[zxi;j;z
a ja0








for any j;z = +;￿, and a0






































40Step 5: In this step, we prove that condition (11) holds for x(a;q) : Y ! Rn if
p￿ is ￿￿regular and the following condition is satis￿ed for ￿ and ￿ :
















If (￿￿) is satis￿ed, it follows directly from Theorem 1 that truthful reporting is a









j] for all ￿0
j
for any a 2 A:
Step 6: Next consider the case of (iii). Take any q 2 Q such that jqij = 1 for
any i. Then it immediately follows from Step 1 and Step 3-5 that we can construct
x(a;q) : Y ! Rn that satisfy (13) and (14) in this case. This is because condition
(12), which requires payo⁄ pro￿les to be on a certain hyperplane, is not imposed
this time.
Step 7: Finally, choose ￿ and ￿ small enough so that (￿) and (￿￿) are satis￿ed
in each case. Observe that we can choose ￿ and ￿ independent of a and q: For each
a 2 A and q 2 Q; de￿ne ￿0 := ￿￿
a;x and ￿ := x(a;q) ￿ E￿0
[x(a;q)ja]: Then ￿ and ￿0
satisfy (9) in addition to (10)-(12) in the case of (ii) and (13)-(14) in the case of
(iii). Therefore the lemma is proved.
We need one more lemma to prove Lemma 4.
Lemma 9 Let M ￿ Rn be a closed and convex set with an interior point in Rn.
Suppose that each boundary point v 2 M is associated with the unique supporting
hyperplane and the unique normal vector ￿v (6= 0) 2 Rn such that ￿v ￿ v ￿ ￿v ￿ x
for all x 2 M. Then for any point y 2 Rn such that ￿v ￿ v > ￿v ￿ y; there exists
￿￿ 2 (0;1) such that (1 ￿ ￿)v + ￿y is in the interior of M for any ￿ 2 (0;￿￿):
Proof. Suppose that this is not the case, i.e. there does not exist such ￿￿ > 0:
Let W = fx 2 Rnj9￿ 2 [0;1];x = (1 ￿ ￿)v + ￿yg.
We ￿rst show W \intM = ?: First v is not an interior point of M by de￿nition.
If (1 ￿ ￿0)v + ￿0y is an interior point for any ￿0 2 (0;1]: Then (1 ￿ ￿)v + ￿y is an
interior point of M for every ￿ 2 (0;￿0) as it is a strictly positive combination of
v 2 M and (1 ￿ ￿0)v +￿0y 2 intM: This is a contradiction. Hence W \intM = ?:
Since W \intM = ?; we can apply the separating hyperplane theorem for each
x￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)v +￿y 2 W; obtaining ￿￿ (6= 0) 2 Rn such that (a) ￿￿ ￿x￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿x for
all x 2 M: Normalize them so that k￿￿k = 1: Since ￿￿ ￿ x￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ v; it also follows
that (b) ￿￿ ￿ y ￿ ￿￿ ￿ v for every ￿ > 0 by the de￿nition of x￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)v + ￿y.
41Take a sequence of ￿￿n such that ￿n > 0 converges to 0 and ￿￿n converges to
some ￿￿ (6= 0) 2 Rn: Then ￿￿ ￿v ￿ ￿￿ ￿x for all x 2 M (from (a)) and ￿￿ ￿y ￿ ￿￿ ￿v
(from (b)) by continuity.
Finally ￿￿ 6= ￿v follows from ￿v ￿v > ￿v ￿y: Hence ￿￿ and ￿v are di⁄erent normal
vectors that separate v from M. This is a contradiction.
We now prove Lemma 4, thus completing the proof of Theorem 3.
.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Choose ￿ > 0 satisfying the conditions of Lemma 8 and let W ￿
intV ￿(G) be a smooth set:We will show that, for any v 2 W; there exists ￿ > 0;
￿ 2 (0;1) and an open set U containing v such that U \ W ￿ B (￿;W;￿):
Step 1: Suppose that v is a boundary point of W. Let q￿ 2 Q be the vector
of utility weights such that v = argmaxv02W q￿ ￿ v0 and a￿ = argmaxa2A q￿ ￿ g (a):
We ￿rst show that v is strictly enforceable for some w0
￿ : Y ! Rn such that q￿ ￿ v >
q￿ ￿ w0
￿ (y) for any y:
Let ￿ : Y ! Rn and ￿0 be the payo⁄ function and public coordinating device as
de￿ned in the conditions of Lemma 8 given q and a￿. Note that, by (ii), we can ￿nd
c > 0 and ￿0 > 0 such that
gj (a￿) + cE￿0
















j and for all j 2 N.
Let u(￿) 2 Rn be the payo⁄ vector to satisfy v = (1 ￿ ￿)g (a￿) + ￿u(￿) for each
￿ 2 (0;1): De￿ne w0
￿ : Y ! Rn as follows.
w0









clearly (1 ￿ ￿)￿0-enforces the payo⁄ pro￿le v for every ￿ 2 (0;1)
(by (15) and (iii)).
Since W is in the interior of the feasible set,
q￿ ￿ g (a￿) > q￿ ￿ v = q￿ ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)g (a￿) + ￿u(￿)]:
Hence q￿ ￿ g (a￿) > q￿ ￿ u(￿) for any ￿ 2 (0;1): Since q￿ ￿ ￿ (y) = 0 by construction,
this implies the desired inequality:
q￿ ￿ v > q￿ ￿ u(￿) = q￿ ￿ w0
￿ (y) for all y 2 Y:
Step 2: We show that w0
￿ : Y ! intW for large enough ￿: Fix any ￿: Since
v = (1 ￿ ￿)g (a￿) + ￿u(￿); w0
￿(y) can be represented by
w0
￿(y) =






42Then for any ￿0 2 (￿;1);we can represent w0
￿0(y) as a positive convex combination











￿0 (1 ￿ ￿)
v for any y 2 Y:
Since Y is a ￿nite set and q￿￿v > q￿￿w0
￿ (y) by step 1, it directly follows from Lemma
9 that w0
￿ takes a value in the interior of W for large enough discount factor.
Step 3: Next suppose that v is an interior point of W: In this case, it is clear
that v is strictly enforceable with some w0
￿ : Y ! Rn and furthermore w0
￿ (y) is in
the interior of W for any y 2 Y if ￿ is close enough to 1.
Step 4: We have shown that, for any v 2 M; there exists ￿0 2 (0;1); a￿ 2 A;
￿0 > 0, ￿0and w0







can now choose " > 0 so that v0 2 U = fz 2 RNjjjz ￿ vjj < "g implies that
w0
￿0 (y)+ v0￿v







with respect to W and ￿0: Hence each v0 2 W \U is
(1￿￿0)￿0-decomposable with respect to W and ￿0: De￿ne ￿ by ￿ := (1￿￿0)￿0: Then
we have W \U ￿ B(￿0;W;￿); i.e. the local strict self decomposability is established.
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